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Abstract
The momentum strategy as described in the seminal work of Jegadeesh and Tit-
man (1993) leads to stream of studies on theoretical work of momentum effect
and empirical analysis in different financial assets and markets of several countries.
However, the characteristics displayed by the momentum strategy have often being
argued that was associated with risk exposures to pricing factors and time-varying
risk. Especially, the investment portfolio’s performance endanger profound draw-
down risk when the market rebounds after financial crisis. In this study, I proposed
the time series residual momentum strategy to mitigate the magnitude of losses. If
the stock positively (negatively) deviates from predicted intrinsic values during a
short-term period, it is denoted as over-valuation (under-valuation). Through inves-
tigating the U.S. stock market, the empirical results show the proposed strategy can
not only achieve significant improvement for the conventional momentum strategy,
but also can substantially reduce the drastic losses from financial crises.
Key words: Momentum; Fama-French Factors; Asset Pricing; Financial Crisis
JEL classification: C3; G2
1. Introduction
As Isaac Newton said “What goes up must come down.” Everything in
earth should obey the law of gravity. Therefore, it is natural to assume the
law of gravity can also be applied in financial market. However, academic
studies have found out that stocks which perform better than the other stocks
in recent past will continue for a certain period. The phenomenon is called
“momentum” effect. Past studies also have confirmed that this effect has been
observed not only in the stock market but also in commodity and currency
markets. The profit cannot be explained away by saying that high-performance
stocks are more risky, or by arguing that the trading cost would eat up all the
profit, instead they are considered potential profitable.
This anomaly also drives a juggernaut through one of the tenets in finan-
cial theory, which is the efficient market hypothesis. In the weak-form efficient
market hypothesis, the past price movements should provide no guide to fu-
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ture price changes. Investors should have no logical reasons to prefer the past
winners to the past losers. Therefore, we are going to revisit the conventional
momentum strategy in the U.S. stock market by using the residual analy-
sis over a longer period from January 1930 to December 2010. Our proposed
strategy can control the short-term behavior and intermediate continuation of
a stock.
The intermediate-horizon return continuations are first reported by Je-
gadeesh and Titman (1993). They propose the momentum strategy, which
buys the past winning stocks over the previous three to twelve months and
sells the past losing stocks over the same period exhibits substantial profit.
Although these results have been widely accepted, researchers are still in de-
bate over the sources of the profit and the interpretation of the evidence. The
momentum effect is not only remarkably persistent in stock market but also in
commodity and currency markets. Okunev and White (2003) find momentum
effect in currencies. Erb and Harvey (2006) find momentum effect in com-
modities. Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012) find momentum effect in ex-
change traded futures contracts. Moreover, the momentum effect is worldwide.
Rouwenhorst (1998) finds evidence of momentum effect in developed stock
markets, and Rouwenhorst (1999) documents momentum effect in emerging
markets.
Although the momentum strategy tends to work well on the winners and
the losers over the past three-to-twelve months, the momentum effect disap-
pears for longer periods in three or five year. Just as trees do not grow to
the sky, share prices do not rise forever. Many investigators have argued the
momentum strategies to display characteristics that are often associated with
factors of price risk. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) reveal the profits of mo-
mentum strategies to exhibit strong variation across the business cycle. In
their study, they show the conventional momentum strategy earns 14.70% an-
nualized return during expansions and loses 8.70% during recessions over the
period from January 1930 to December 2009. Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed
(2004) further examine the variation of average returns to the U.S. equity mo-
mentum strategies. They find in “UP” states, which are defined by the lagged
three-year return of the market, the historical mean of returns of a equally-
weighted momentum strategy is 0.93% per month. In “DOWN” states, the
historical mean of returns of a equally-weighted momentum strategy is -0.37%
per month. It means those losers often experience strong gains after the market
collapses. In such circumstances, implementation of the momentum strategy
will result in persistent strings of negative returns. It leads to a momentum
crash.
In this paper, we propose a more effective strategy, time series residual
momentum, which ranks all eligible stocks based on their total returns and
residual returns in the recent past months. The advantage of the time series
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momentum strategy is not only to reduce the time-varying exposures but also
to eliminate the “value risk,” which occurs when a stock is overvalued. There-
fore, this time series residual momentum strategy performs better than the
conventional momentum strategy and the the residual momentum strategy.
Most important of all, it can avoid the huge loss of the conventional momen-
tum strategy after 2000.
To sum, in past decades, financial academics and practitioners have rec-
ognized that the momentum strategy can generate significant profit and that
the momentum effect exists in many financial markets. But, fewer people no-
tice the collapse of the momentum is profound especially after the financial
crisis. In this study, we adjust the conventional momentum strategy in the
U.S. stock market by using the residual analysis over the period from Jan-
uary 1930 to December 2010. The modification we proposed can take care of
the short-term behavior and the intermediate continuation of a stock. The
empirical results show the modification can largely improve the conventional
momentum strategy.
2. Momentum Crash
We first examine the conventional momentum strategy over a longer pe-
riod in the U.S. stock market from January 1930 to December 2010. Most
of time, the market appears to underreact to the public information and
results in consistent price momentum. However, in extreme conditions, the
past losers of the momentum strategy often comprise a very high premium.
When the market conditions are going better, those past losers will experience
strong gains. This leads to a “momentum crash.” It is because the returns of
the conventional momentum strategies are highly-skewed. Therefore, investors
who implement the conventional momentum strategy will experience strings
of negative returns, especially after the market collapses.
Data and Portfolio Formation
The data for the study is from CRSP monthly files. Our data consists of
all domestic, primary stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and Nasdaq (NASDAQ) stock markets
during the period from January 1929 to December 2010. We utilize only the
returns on common shares with a 10 or 11 CRSP share-code. Close-end funds,
Real Estate Investment Trust (REITs), unit trusts, American Depository Re-
ceipts (ADRs), and foreign stocks are excluded from the analysis. We also
exclude stocks with price below $1 during the formation periods to reduce the
microstructure effect associated with low-price stocks.
Following most of the literature, we rank the stocks based on their past
twelve-month returns excluding the most recent month. Then we assign these
stocks into 10 equally weighted portfolios at the end day of each formation
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Fig. 1. Momentum Portfolio Formation
month. Each portfolio is held for one month following the formation month.
The reason why we focus on their past twelve-month returns excluding the
most recent month is that this momentum definition is currently most broadly
used and readily available through the PR1YR factor of Carhart (1997). The
momentum strategy is typically to disentangle the intermediate horizon mo-
mentum effect from the short reversal effect documented by Jegadeesh (1993)
and Lehmann (1990).
Figure 1 illustrates time line of the portfolio formation process for the
momentum returns in May 2009. The ranking period returns are the cumula-
tive returns from the close of the last trading day in April 2008 to the close
of the last trading day in March 2009. We sort all firms that meet the data
requirements into 10-decile portfolios which are labeled P1 to P10 according
to their cumulative returns over the ranking period. The 10% of firms with
the highest ranking period returns go into portfolio P10, the “[W]inner”-decile
portfolio, and those with the lowest ranking period returns go into portfolio
P1, the “[L]oser”-decile portfolio. The return on a zero investment “Winner-
Minus-Loser” (WML) portfolio is the difference of the return on the Winner
and the return on the Loser portfolio in each period.
The monthly returns of the decile portfolios are based on the equally-
weighted returns. Decile membership does not change in a month, except for
the case of delisting. We also consider the overlapping portfolios approach,
which is a strategy that holds a series of portfolios selected in the current
month and the previous month. The market return we used is Dow Jones
Industry Average (DJIA) index downloaded from Yahoo! Finance. 1 The risk-
free rate and the cross-sectional Fama-French three factors are downloaded
from the data library of Kenneth R. French. 2
Momentum Portfolio Performance
Table 1 presents the moments of the momentum decile portfolios from
January 1930 to December 2010. For all portfolios, Mean, Std, Skew and Kurt
1 We use DJIA instead of S&P 500 because the first trading day of S&P 500 is Jan
3, 1950.
2 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french
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denote the full-period realized mean, stand deviation, skewness and kurtosis
of the monthly returns to the portfolios. The average return of the winner
portfolio is 1.63% per month and is 0.69% of the loser portfolio. A self-financing
strategy that buys the top 10%, Winner, and sells the bottom 10%, Loser,
produces profits of 0.94% per month. The result is consistent with the existing
literature, which states that there is a strong momentum premium over the
past 80-year period.
Table 1
Twelve-Month Momentum Portfolio Characteristics, January 1930-December 2010
Portfolio Mean Std Skew Kurt
P1 (Past Loser) 0.69% 0.1067 2.3866 17.9023
P2 0.82% 0.0819 1.6241 14.4532
P3 1.01% 0.0781 2.1760 20.5349
P4 1.06% 0.0719 1.5558 15.7259
P5 1.15% 0.0690 1.1678 13.2865
P6 1.20% 0.0663 0.9465 12.3870
P7 1.28% 0.0645 0.4184 7.8186
P8 1.41% 0.0676 0.6713 9.8730
P9 1.54% 0.0718 0.3366 6.9300
P10 (Past Winner) 1.63% 0.0870 1.0294 13.4764
WML 0.94% 0.0701 -2.7992 22.7026
The skewness of the past loser portfolio is 2.3866, and the skewness of
the past winner portfolio is 1.0294. The skewness of the past loser portfolio is
more than twice of the skewness of the past winner portfolio. One should note
that the past loser portfolios are considerably positively-skewed than the past
winner portfolios. Therefore, the skewness of WML portfolio is -2.7992, which
is largely negative-skewed. Another thing we should note is that the kurtosis
of WML portfolio is 22.7026, which is also considerably large than usual.
The skewness of returns on momentum portfolios is not surprising. For
example, Wall Street calls a high momentum stock that suddenly collapses
as a “torpedo.” A torpedoed stock is a stock hit by new negative information
after a long period of positive information. As the stock price has continuously
increased in the past, investors may expect that the company’s business is in
good conditions. Hence, the upward trend in earnings will more likely con-
tinue. However, it remains possible that the trend of increasing earnings may
suddenly reverse. When it occurs, the positive effect on the stock’s earnings
may also be reversed, ex. some stocks in the technology sector, where new in-
novations make existing technologies obsolete. Those fast-growing companies
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Fig. 2. Cumulative Monthly Returns of WML, DJIA and Risk-free, January
1930-December 2010
which depend on existing technologies might be affected. The growth of these
firms suddenly stop.
Figure 2 presents the cumulative monthly returns 3 for investing $1 ini-
tially in (1) the risk-free asset; (2) the DJIA index; and (3) the zero investment
portfolio, WML portfolio, respectively, over the period from January 1930 to
December 2010. On the right side of the plot, we present the final dollar values
for each of the three portfolios. We can see the final value of WML is $448.73,
DJIA is $46.59, and the risk-free asset is $17.78. The momentum strategy does
earn a significant return.
Momentum Crashes
Good things don’t last long. The momentum strategy appears to loose
their profitability in the recent years. Again, we plot the cumulative monthly
returns for investments in the risk-free asset, the DJIA index, and the WML
portfolio from January 2000 to December 2010 as shown in Figure 3. We
can find the WML portfolio loses almost 70% at the end of 2010. In fact,
it lost 1.46% per annum over the period from January 2000 to December
2010. The large losses of the WML portfolio occured in the first half of 2009,
3 The cumulative return on an implementable strategy is an investment at time 0
and fully reinvested at each time point. During the period, there is no cash put in
or taken out. R(t, T ) denotes the cumulative return between time t to T , R(t, T ) =∏T
s=t+1(1 + Rs).
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Fig. 3. Cumulative Monthly Returns of WML, DJIA and Riskfree, January 2000-De-
cember 2010
especially in March, April, and May. The losses were 18.22%, 39.52%, and
14.29% respectively. The rough under-performance appears when the market
rebounds from the bottom. We argue that the large negative skewness of the
WML portfolio can cause the momentum crash.
Table 2
Top 10 Worst-Month WML Portfolio Returns
Rank Month Past Loser Past Winner WML DJIA
1 1932/07 77.76% 15.58% -62.18% 25.79%
2 2001/01 78.79% 17.74% -61.05% 0.92%
3 1932/08 100.08% 43.18% -56.91% 35.76%
4 1939/09 81.67% 24.78% -56.89% 11.72%
5 2009/04 48.12% 8.61 % -39.52% 7.35%
6 2002/11 37.68% 8.26 % -29.42% 5.94%
7 1932/01 29.66% 5.14 % -24.53% -1.73%
8 1975/01 44.12% 20.02% -24.10% 14.19%
9 1938/06 38.84% 16.52% -22.32% 24.26%
10 1974/01 24.72% 4.84 % -19.88% 0.55%
Table 2 presents the top ten worst-month returns of the WML strat-
egy over the periods from January 1930 to December 2010. The table also
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gives the contemporaneous monthly returns of DJIA. These returns often oc-
cur when the market has dramatic downturns, and during a month where
the market gradually rises. For example, during the two-month period from
July to August in 1932, the DJIA increased 61.55%, but the return of the
WML portfolio decreased 119.09%. As we can also see from the Table 2, dur-
ing the two-month period, returns of the Past Loser deciles are 77.76% and
100.08% outperform the returns of the Past Winner deciles which are 15.58%
and 43.18% respectively. Thus, the strong momentum reversals can be charac-
terized as a momentum crash. The momentum crash happens in the short side
of the portfolio, the past losers portfolios, which are crashing up rather than
down. We should also notice that these momentum crashes are also clustered
as shown in Figure 4. The strong performance of the past losers occurs over
the span of multiple months.
Robustness Check
For robustness check, we also plot the cumulative monthly WML portfolio
returns over the period from January 1930 to December 2010 by considering
different formation periods, i.e., we rank the stocks based on the past j-month
return, where j=3, 6, and 9. The result is shown as Figure 5. We can see the
cumulative monthly WML return based on the past 3-month return is $2.79.
The cumulative monthly WML return basing on the past 6-month return is
$7.11. And the cumulative monthly WML return basing on the past 9-month
return is $17.11. The best performance of cumulative monthly WML return
is based on past 12-month return, which reaches $448.73. Thus, we focus on
the 12-month formation period as our momentum strategy analysis hereafter.
Table 3 presents the moments of the momentum decile portfolios from
January 1930 to December 2010 based on the past 3-month return. The skew-
ness of the past loser portfolios is 1.5887, and the skewness of the past win-
ner portfolios is 0.3401. The skewness of WML portfolios is -2.8086, which is
negative. The kurtosis of WML portfolios is 22.8985. Table 4 presents the mo-
ments of the momentum decile portfolios from January 1930 to December 2010
based on the past 6-month return. The skewness of the past loser portfolios
is 2.0914, and the skewness of the past winner portfolios is 0.0396. The skew-
ness of WML portfolios is -2.6249, which is negative. The kurtosis of WML
portfolios is 19.7919. Table 5 presents the moments of the momentum decile
portfolios from January 1930 to December 2010 based on the past 9-month
return. The skewness of the past loser portfolios is 2.1495, and the skewness
of the past winner portfolios is 0.8497. The skewness of WML portfolios is
-3.1013, which is negative. The kurtosis of WML portfolios is 22.4271.
Further, we plot the cumulative monthly WML portfolio returns over the
period from January 2000 to December 2010 by considering different formation
periods as shown in Figure 6. We can see the cumulative monthly WML return
8
Fig. 4. Momentum Portfolio Performance, January 1930-December 2010
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Table 3
Characteristics of 3-month Momentum Portfolios, January 1930-December 2010
Portfolio Mean Std Skew Kurt
P1 (Past Loser) 0.91% 0.1013 1.5887 10.4791
P2 1.09% 0.0871 1.8941 15.8793
P3 1.23% 0.0807 2.1182 19.4230
P4 1.19% 0.0719 1.2167 13.2133
P5 1.15% 0.0671 0.6108 8.6659
P6 1.17% 0.0664 0.7823 11.5043
P7 1.15% 0.0644 0.3849 7.1533
P8 1.16% 0.0664 0.3782 7.8832
P9 1.16% 0.0700 0.2545 6.3014
P10 (Past Winner) 1.24% 0.0805 0.3401 6.3945
WML 0.33% 0.0613 -2.8086 22.8985
Table 4
Characteristics of 6-month Momentum Portfolios, January 1930-December 2010
Portfolio Mean Std Skew Kurt
P1 (Past Loser) 0.95% 0.1073 2.0914 13.6075
P2 1.02% 0.0878 2.0454 16.3411
P3 1.06% 0.0794 1.7692 15.2567
P4 1.16% 0.0761 2.1912 20.9869
P5 1.16% 0.0692 1.3928 14.3128
P6 1.18% 0.0680 1.0820 13.3095
P7 1.17% 0.0641 0.3624 7.9755
P8 1.18% 0.0644 -0.1076 5.2800
P9 1.35% 0.0689 -0.0565 5.1462
P10 (Past Winner) 1.44% 0.0811 0.0396 4.4203
WML 0.49% 0.0691 -2.6249 19.7919
based on the past 3-month return is $0.51. The cumulative monthly WML
return based on the past 6-month return is $0.47. And the cumulative monthly
WML return based on the past 9-month returns is $0.2. It shows that the
momentum crash won’t eliminate no matter how many months of the past
j-month return we consider, where j=3, 6, 9, and 12.
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Fig. 5. j-Month Momentum Portfolios Performance, January 1930-December 2010
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Table 5
Characteristics of 9-month Momentum Portfolios, January 1930-December 2010
Portfolio Mean Std Skew Kurt
P1 (Past Loser) 0.82% 0.1066 2.1495 15.7713
P2 0.97% 0.0870 2.2791 19.8423
P3 1.02% 0.0780 1.6489 15.1072
P4 1.07% 0.0713 1.2550 12.4999
P5 1.09% 0.0686 1.1951 12.7131
P6 1.19% 0.0665 1.0374 12.1164
P7 1.28% 0.0668 0.8437 10.9467
P8 1.28% 0.0673 0.4746 10.1607
P9 1.44% 0.0717 0.4868 8.7271
P10 (Past Winner) 1.48% 0.0852 0.8497 11.3598
WML 0.66% 0.0736 -3.1013 22.4271
3. Time Series Residual Momentum Strategy
Many investigators have argued that the characteristics displayed by the
momentum strategy are often associated with factors of price risk. Chordia and
Shivakumar (2002) show that the profits of momentum strategies to exhibit
strong variation across the business cycle. They report that the conventional
momentum strategy earns 14.70% annualized return during expansions and
loses 8.70% during recessions over the period from January 1930 to December
2009.
In addition, Blitz, Huij and Martens (2011) also argue that the con-
ventional momentum strategies exhibit the time-varying exposures to Fama-
French three factors. To counter this drawback, they propose the “residual
momentum strategy” to reduce the time-varying exposures by ranking all
stocks based on its own residual returns instead of the total returns. Blitz,
Huij and Martens (2011) show that the residual momentum strategy can earn
profits that are about twice as large as the conventional momentum strategy
with more consistency over time.
The literature on momentum strategies focus on the relative performance
of securities in cross-sectional perspective. Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012)
propose the “time series momentum strategy” in equity index, currency, com-
modity, and bond futures. They only focus on a security’s past returns. They
found that the past twelve-month returns of a security to show strong positive
influence on its future return with persistent effect for about one year, followed
by partially-reversed role over longer horizons. This strategy can also deliver
12
Fig. 6. Cumulative Monthly Returns of j-Month Momentum Portfolios, January
2000-December 2010
substantial abnormal returns with little exposure to the standard asset pricing
factor to perform well during extreme market condition.
The advantage of cross-sectional residual momentum is to reduce the time-
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varying exposures. On the other hand, the advantage of the time series momen-
tum is that the security’s past returns provide strong positive predictability to
its future returns. Hence, it is natural to combine the cross-sectional residual
momentum strategy and time series momentum strategy into the “time series
residual momentum strategy.” Our empirical evidence shows the strategy can
avoid the huge loss in recent years.
Cross-Sectional Residual Momentum
The residual momentum strategy proposed by Blitz, Huij and Martens
(2011) is also known as a “cross-sectional” residual momentum strategy, since
their approach focused on the cross-sectional relative performance in residual
returns of securities. Their formula is shown as follows. In each month t, the
residual returns are estimated by using Fama-French three factors model, that
is,
rit = α
i + βi1MKTt + β
i
2SMBt + β
i
3HMLt + 
i
t (1)
where rit is the excess return of stock i in month t. MKTt, SMBt, and HMLt
are the excess returns of factor-mimicking portfolios for the market, size and,
value in month t. αi, βi1, β
i
2 and β
i
3 are parameters to be estimated. And 
i
t is
the residual return.
Only the stocks with complete return history of over 36-month rolling
regression window were included. The purpose of using 36-month rolling win-
dows is to ensure having a sufficient number of return observations to obtain
accurate estimates for stock exposures to the market, size, and value. In order
to obtain the residual return, the regression over 36-month rolling windows,
was run, i.e., over the period from t− 36 to t− 1 to get the estimated param-
eters αˆi, βˆi1, βˆ
i
2 and βˆ
i
3 of each stock i. The estimated residual return of stock
i in month t is
eit = r
i
t − (βˆi1MKTt + βˆi2SMBt + βˆi3HMLt), (2)
where the estimated αˆi is not included, since the intercept of regression served
as a general control for the misspecification in the model for expected stock
returns.
At each formation month t, they rank all eligible stocks into 10-decile
portfolios according to the estimated residual returns from past twelve months,
standardized by the standard deviation over the same period of time. The cu-
mulative monthly returns of the residual momentum strategy and total return
momentum strategy are plotted by Blitz, Huij and Martens (2011) in Figure
7.
As a result, the highest value of the residual momentum strategy over
the period from January 1930 to December 2010 was about $10,000, larger
than those of total return momentum. This suggested that the performance of
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Fig. 7. Cumulative monthly returns plot by Blitz, Huij and Martens (2011), January
1930-December 2010
the residual momentum strategy is more consistent in compared to the con-
ventional momentum strategy. In addition, this also exposed how poorly the
conventional momentum strategy has performed during “The Great Depres-
sion” that started from 1929 and lasted until the late 1930s or early 1940s.
Time Series Momentum
The literature on momentum strategies focus on the relative performance
of securities in cross-sectional perspective. Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012)
propose the “time series momentum strategy” in equity index, currency, com-
modity, and bond futures, with focus on past returns of a security. In their
study, they first examine the time series predictability of future returns across
different time horizons. In other words, they regress the excess return rt in the
month t on its lagged h months return, rt−h. Both of the returns are scaled
by their ex-ante volatilities, σ2t−1 and σ
2
t−h−1,
rt
σ2t−1
= α + βh
rt−h
σ2t−h−1
+ t, (3)
where the ex-ante volatility is annualized as follows:
σ2t = 261
∞∑
i=0
(1− δ)δi(rt−1−i − r¯t)2. (4)
261 is the factor which scales the variance to be annual, r¯t is the exponential
weighted average return, and the weight (1− δ)δi add up to 1. The parameter
δ is chosen so that the center of mass of the weight is 60 days. The way to
adjust futures returns by their ex-ante volatilities is similar to use the Gener-
alized Least Squares instead of Ordinary Least Squares. They find a positive
15
Fig. 8. Time Series Predictability by Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2010)
t-statistic for the first twelve months, indicating the significant continuation
and trend in its return.
Figure 8 shows that t-statistics are positive in twelve months. This indi-
cates the significant return continuation or trends. In their study, the most
strong time series momentum effect are on the properties of the past twelve-
month time series momentum and one month holding period. The time series
momentum strategy is defined to take a long position if the past twelve-month
cumulative excess return is positive and a short position if the past twelve-
month cumulative excess return is negative. The position is scaled by the
ex-ante annualized volatility that is 0.60%. Therefore, the return of the time
series momentum strategy for security i from time t to t+ 1 is as follow:
sign(rit−12,t)
0.06%
σit
rit,t+1, (5)
where σit is defined as same as (4) and r
i
t,t+1 is the return of security i from
time t to t+ 1.
Time Series Residual Momentum
Previous literatures have generally attributed the momentum effect to
firm-specific returns, arguing that investors have either under-reacted or be-
latedly overreacted to the firm-specific returns. Recently, Lewellen (2002) stud-
ied the momentum effect in focusing on the role of industry, size, and B/M
factors. Lewellen (2002) argued that it is impossible to explain the signifi-
cant component of momentum through firm-specific returns with behavioral
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model. Instead, that the excess covariance, not underreaction, can explain the
momentum effect in the portfolios.
It is well known that the momentum effect is a cross-sectional result and
it is not the same as positive autocorrelation. As Lo and MacKinlay (1990)
showed in 1990, the possibility of momentum effect been caused by the auto-
correlation in returns, the lead-lag relation among stocks (cross-serial correla-
tion) or the cross-sectional dispersion in unconditional means. Later, Lewellen
(2002) has also proposed a simpler strategy based on Lo and Mackinlay’s
theory to consider holding assets in proportion to the market-adjust returns,
shown as followed.
The proportion weight of asset i in month t is
wit =
1
N
(rit−1 − rmt−1), (6)
where rit−1 is the asset’s return in month t−1, rmt−1 is the corresponding return
on the equally-weighted index, and N is the total number of stocks. Assuming
that returns have unconditional mean µ ≡ E[rt] and autocovariance matrix
Ω ≡ E[(rt−1 − µ)(rt − µ)′]. Therefore, the portfolio return in month t equals
pit =
∑
i
witr
i
t =
1
N
∑
i
(rit−1 − rmt−1)rit, (7)
and the expected profit is
E[pit] =
1
N
E[
∑
i
(rit−1r
i
t)]−
1
N
E[
∑
i
(rmt−1r
i
t)]
=
1
N
∑
i
(ρi + µ
2
i )− (ρm + µ2m), (8)
where ρi and ρm are the autocovariances of asset i and the equally-weighted
index m. (8) shows that the profit of the portfolio depends on the magnitude
of asset autocovariances relative to market’s auto-covariance. (8) can also be
written into a matrix notation. Let the average autocovariance equal tr(Ω)/N
and the autocovariance of the market portfolio equal 1′Ω1/N2. tr(·) denotes
the sum of the diagonals and 1′ is a vector of ones. Therefore, (4.8) equals
E[pit] =
1
N
tr(Ω)− 1
N2
1′Ω1+ σ2µ
=
N − 1
N2
tr(Ω)− 1
N2
[1′Ω1− tr(Ω)] + σ2µ, (9)
where σ2µ is the cross-sectional variance of unconditional expected returns [col-
lecting the µ2i and µ
2
m terms in (8)].
The decompositions of Lewellen (2002) suggest the profit of momentum
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Table 6
Categories of Momentum Strategy
Momentum Residual Momentum
Cross Section Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), ... Blitz, Huij and Martens (2011)
Time Series Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012) Our study
to rise in three ways as followed. First, stocks are positively autocorrelated,
so firms currently with high returns are expected to have high returns in
the future. Second, since the stock returns are negatively correlated to the
lagged returns of other stocks, high future returns can be predicted by the
other stocks’ poor performances. Third, stocks simply have high unconditional
expected returns relative to the other stocks. Overall, the empirical finding of
Lewellen (2002) has concluded the lead-lag relations to play an important role
among stocks.
One of the advantages in cross-sectional residual momentum is that it
consists of the ability to reduce the time-varying exposure effect of the con-
ventional momentum strategies. This time series momentum shows that the
future returns of a stock can be forecast by its past returns. In addition,
in the decomposition of Lewellen (2002), it is natural to combine the cross-
sectional residual momentum strategy with time series momentum strategy
into the “time series residual momentum strategy.” Summary of the different
categories in current momentum strategy is shown in Table 6.
Methodology
Without loss of generality, we assume that there are n securities with Ti to
be the length of security i. To implement the time series residual momentum
strategy, the first step is to estimate the time series residual returns of each
security. In following with Blitz, Huij and Martens (2011), we ran the following
regression through the same equation as equation (1) in month t, for each
security i, where the residual returns eit is obtained by equation (2).
We propose a measure of value risk, denoting qit(j) for security i based on
its own past j-month time series residual return in the month t. The qit(j) is
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Fig. 9. Q-Q plot
defined as:
qit(j) = Φ(
∑t−j+1
t e
i
t√
j × σˆ2t
), (10)
where σˆ2t is the variance of e
i
t over the same period, j is the strength of value
risk over the past j months ( j = 3, 6, 9 or 12), and Φ is the cumulative
function of a standard Normal distribution.
qit(j) can be viewed as a proxy measure of the present value relative to its
long-term equilibrium level. qit(j) is used to describe whether or not a stock’s
recent j -month return has been overvalued. Through this formula, we can form
the portfolios based on independently sort all eligible stocks by their own past
12-month accumulative monthly return and j -month value-risk measure, qit(j)
at each formation month t.
In argument regarding to whether or not
∑t−j+1
t
eit√
j×σˆ2t
follows a Standard
Normal distribution can be confirmed by a Q-Q plot of
∑t−j+1
t
eit√
j×σˆ2t
for a stock
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with its permno number 10006, as shown in Figure 9. The Q-Q plot was
constructed using different j -month, j=3, 6, 9 and 12. In j=3, the sample
quantiles were approvimate to the Standard Normal distribution, confirming
that it is not inappropriate to use Φ as the transformation.
In order to form the portfolios, the stocks were first assigned into one of 10
portfolios based on their cumulative returns over the previous twelve months.
The top 10% of firms with the highest ranking period returns were filed into
portfolio P10, the “[W]inner” decile portfolio. On the other hand, the bottom
10% of firms with the lowest ranking period returns were filed into portfolio
P1, the “[L]oser” decile portfolio. Besides, the stocks are also independently
assigned into one of the 3 portfolios with the categories of [U]nder, [M]iddle
and [O]ver, based on the value-risk measures over the same period of time.
In combination of the two separately arranged ranking methods, up to 30
value-risk momentum portfolios were obtained. “WU-LO” was defined as the
monthly portfolio return of the “[W]inner that is [U]nder-valued minus the
[L]oser that is [O]ver-valued.” A return on a zero investment of a WU-LO
portfolio is the difference between the return in the undervalued winner and
overvalued loser portfolio in each time period. In this study, only monthly
return over next one month was focused based on a equally-weighted average
of the portfolio returns.
Empirical results
The results are shown in Table 7, where the standard deviations are in the
parentheses. As seen from the table, when j = 3, the monthly average return
of the WU-LO portfolio is 2.44% that is equal to 33.57% annual return. For j
= 6, the monthly average return of the WU-LO portfolio is 1.67% that is equal
to 22.06% annual return. For j = 9, the monthly average return of the WU-LO
portfolio is 1.74% that is equal to 23.01% annual return. Overall, the returns
of these three WU-LO portfolios outperformed the conventional momentum
strategy. We further use one-tailed t-test to examine the difference between
the returns of WU-LO portfolio and WML. For j = 3, the t-test statistic of
WU-LO portfolio to WML is 3.4675 with p-value < 0.01. For j = 6, the t-test
statistic of WU-LO portfolio to WML is 1.4003 with p-value < 0.1. For j = 9
and j = 12, the t-test statistics are not significant at 5% significant level.
Initially, our study focused on the consideration of short-termed contrar-
ian and the continuation in intermediate momentum of each stock. As a result,
the improvement in conventional momentum strategy with value risk was ob-
served, mainly due to the undervaluing of a firm at its high momentum. At this
circumstance, the stock price will tend to rise instead of fall in the following
month. Thus, our strategy was aimed at controlling the short-term behavior
of a stock and the persistent intermediate momentum.
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Figure 10 plot the monthly portfolio return of the time series momentum
strategy (j = 3) over the period from July 1967 to December 2010. As a re-
sult, the time series momentum strategy was shown to perform better than
the conventional momentum strategy as shown in Figure 3.4. In addition, the
WU-LO portfolio returns were observed to be more stable than the returns of
conventional momentum portfolio, though we also recognized the imperfection
of our strategy with incapability of avoiding a huge loss of -37.86% in April
2009. Further plotting on the cumulative monthly return of conventional mo-
mentum strategy and time series residual momentum strategy over the time
period from July 1967 to December 2010 was also shown in Figure 11. As a
result, the cumulative monthly return of WU-LO is $116,926.2; whereas the
cumulative monthly return of WML was shown to be $69.09. In considering
the performance after 2000, the cumulative monthly return was also plotted for
conventional momentum strategy and time series residual momentum strategy
over the time period from January 2000 to December 2010, as shown in Figure
12. The WML was shown to lose about 70% in December 2010 compared to
its initial investment in January 2000. As for the value using our strategy,
217.10% was observed in December 2010 comparing to its initial investment
in January 2000.
4. Conclusions and Future Researches
The momentum effect has been widely accepted in financial market. But,
fewer people notice the collapse of the momentum is profound especially after
financial crisis. There are “momentum crashes.” Just as trees do not grow
to the sky, likewise, share prices do not rise forever. The momentum crash
is because that conventional momentum strategy exhibits substantial time-
varying exposures to the market.
In this study, we revisit the conventional momentum strategy in the U.S.
stock market by the residual analysis and the price-risk adjustment over a long
period of time, from January 1930 to December 2010. Such time-varying expo-
sures of the conventional momentum strategy can be reduced by the residual
analysis and the price-risk adjustment. The idea was when a firm is under-
valued (under-priced) at its high momentum; the stock price tends to rise
instead of fall in the following month. Conversely, when a firm is overvalued
(over-priced) at its low momentum, the stock price tends to fall instead of
rise. The strategies that we proposed can control the short-term behavior of
a stock and the intermediate continuation.
Overall, our empirical results showed that through these two strategies,
significant improvement was observed in compared to the conventional mo-
mentum strategy, suggesting it to be a better way for portfolios management
in future studies. Even more, this new concept of residual analysis can also be
further applied to other financial markets as commodities and currencies.
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Fig. 10. Time Series Momentum Portfolio Performance, July 1967-December 2010
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Fig. 11. Cumulative Monthly Returns of WML, WU-LO, July 1967-December 2010
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Fig. 12. Cumulative Monthly Returns of WML, WU-LO, January 2000-December
2010
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